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STICKY FORMS, PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND LAW
Larry E. Ribstein*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Mitu Gulati and Robert E. Scott have written a fascinating study
that touches on some of the most important issues in lawyering and law.'
A Belgian court rendered a judgment that highlights a significant risk in
a common sovereign bond provision.2 Specifically, the court interpreted
a contract requiring the Republic of Peru to pay its creditors paripassu3
to say what it seemed to say-that Peru had to treat its creditors equally.4
The court accordingly enjoined a clearing house from allocating to
creditors funds it received from the Peruvian government pursuant to a
restructuring agreement without proportionally paying the plaintiff, a
hedge fund which had declined to join the agreement. 5
Since these are high-value deals negotiated by prestigious and
expensive lawyers, one might expect sovereign bond contracts to have
swiftly changed to mitigate the risk. But this did not happen. Gulati and
Scott seek to explain this puzzle by interviewing hundreds of lawyers
with knowledge of the relevant contracts and distilling their responses.
They make the mass of raw material cogent by viewing it through the
lens of legal and economic theory.
* Mildred van Voorhis Jones Chair, University of Illinois College of Law. Thanks to Mitu
Gulati, Bruce Kobayashi, and Mark Weidemaier for their helpful comments. Professor Larry
Ribstein passed away while this piece was in the final editorial stages. All through the process,
Professor Ribstein had been a genuine pleasure to work with, always generous and encouraging to
the Hofstra Law Review Board of Editors. It is a great honor for the Hofstra Law Review to publish
one of the final pieces by Professor Ribstein, not only one of the most prolific legal scholars in the
academy, but one of the most beloved.
1. See generally MITU GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE THREE AND A HALF MINUTE
TRANSACTION: BOILERPLATE AND THE LIMITS OF CONTRACT DESIGN (forthcoming 2012) (on file

with the Hofstra Law Review).
2. Elliott Assocs., L.P., General Docket No. 2000/QR/92, fi 6, 8 (Court of Appeal of
Brussels, 8th Chamber, Sept. 26, 2000) (unofficial translation on file with the Hofstra Law Review).
3.
4.

GULATI & SCOTT, supra note I (manuscript at 21).
Elliott Assocs., 6.

5. Id. 8.
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The authors find the answer to the puzzle in the fact that law firms
preferred to use little understood mass-produced contracts they could
pull off the shelf in "three and a half minutes" (hence the title of the
book).6 They conclude that "[t]he lawyers producing these contracts
seem, for the most part, to follow the herd. There is safety.., in
following what everyone else does, regardless of whether it makes sense.
there isn't enough time to figure out whether it makes sense or
Maybe
7
not.",
Gulati and Scott attribute this phenomenon to "the organizational
structure of law firms, including hourly billing and compensation, the
secondary role given to [research and development], and the manner in
which legal services are marketed."8 They propose addressing these
issues through:
[Glovemance mechanisms that facilitate and support innovation. New
forms of governance that overcome the obstacles to innovative contract
design can preserve a meaningful role for the modem law firm and the
legal profession in the full range of corporate and commercial
but certainly not limited to, the field of
transactions including,
9
sovereign debt.
My approach to the problem is similarly institutional but differs in
focus. I suggest that the problem lies deeper than the modem law firmin the structure of what lawyers do and in the weak intellectual property
rights available to creators of law. Part II defines the problem, while Part
III examines the institutional factors that impede a solution.

II. DEFINING THE PROBLEM
This Part analyzes three potential views of the "three and a half
minute" problem: there was no problem after all because the pari passu
clause was what the parties wanted; there was a problem but it was not
worth trying to fix it; or there was a problem that was worth fixing but
existing institutions were not up to the task. I conclude that the third
view best fits Gulati and Scott's evidence. Part III discusses the
institutional reforms necessary to fix the problem.

6.

GULATI & Scor, supra note I (manuscript at 12).

7. Id. (manuscript at 193).
8.
9.

Id. (manuscript at 181).
Id. (manuscript at 182).
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A.

The Clause Was What the PartiesWanted All Along

Gulati and Scott suggest that, while the troublesome pari passu
clause may have been appropriate in a corporate bond to deal with
liquidation and distribution of a limited fund, it makes no sense in a
sovereign bond because sovereigns cannot be liquidated.'0 This suggests
an easy fix: eliminate the provision.
There are, however, several reasons why these provisions may be
useful outside of bankruptcy, and therefore why simply deleting the
provision might not work. First, the authors cite historical evidence
suggesting that creditors were concerned about the risk of "earmarking"
funds.'" Second, the authors discuss cases which seem to involve risks of
the sort a pari passu clause could deal with in sovereign bonds and
therefore suggest the clause had a purpose in this context, particularly2
protecting creditors from being coerced into a below-value settlement.
Lucian Bebchuk recognized this coercion problem in corporate takeover
cases not involving bankruptcy.1 3 William Bratton has specifically noted
the coordination problem addressed by pari passu and other sovereign
bond clauses. 14 Third, a pari passu clause arguably enables the issuing
country to commit not to fail given the high cost of failure from
empowering holdouts. 15 Indeed, Gulati and others show elsewhere that
sovereign bonds containing the type of pari passu clause that fit the
interpretation Elliott Associates, L.P. ("Elliott") was arguing traded at a
higher price than bonds that had a more ambiguous clause.16
Yet Gulati and Scott argue that what really matters is "that the vast
majority of the respondents we interviewed believed that the clause made
little or no sense in the sovereign context."' 7 But perhaps we should not
take the lawyers' protestations at face value. They may have had
strategic reasons for discounting the importance of the protection the
pari passu clause provides if their clients were trying to promote non-

10. See id. (manuscript at 34-35).
11. Id. (manuscript at 125-26, 141-42) (internal quotation marks omitted).
12. Id. (manuscript at 148-49).
13. See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in
Corporate Takeovers, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1693 (1985) (discussing the unequal distribution of a
takeover's total acquisition price among the target's shareholders).
14. William W. Bratton, Pari Passu and a Distressed Sovereign's Rational Choices, 53
EMORY L.J. 823, 828-32 (2004).
15. See GULATI & ScOTT, supra note 1 (manuscript at 31-32).
16. Michael Bradley et al., The Market Reaction to Legal Shocks and Their Antidotes:
Lessons from the Sovereign Debt Market, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 289, 312-13 (2010).
17. GULATI & ScoTT, supranote I (manuscript at 21).
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pari passu settlements. 18 So whatever the lawyers say, it is worth
keeping in mind the possibility that the clause did not change because
bondholders wanted to keep it.
B. The Clause Was Not What the Parties Wanted But Is Now Hard to
Change
Even if the pari passu clause may have been what the parties
initially wanted, their reaction to the Belgian judgment indicates they no
longer wanted it. Even if, for example, the parties want a pari passu
clause at the time of issuance for protection from unequal treatment or as
an issuer commitment not to fail, they also want to be able to restructure
bonds in times of trouble. This would support the Belgian court's result
but still raises the question of why the parties did not change the
contracts by eliminating the clause.
One reason for not changing a contract clause that has stopped
making sense is that the costs of change outweigh the benefits. Given the
above arguments for the clause, the fix is more complicated than just
deleting it. The parties may want some kind of paripassu clause but not
necessarily the one involved in the Peruvian bond. In other words, the
clause is more than an infection of an appendix, as one of the
interviewed attorneys suggested. 19 Also, substituting a new clause could
force the parties to incur significant learning costs, 20 disrupt the market
"network" that facilitates trading of bonds based on the bonds' similarity
at any given time 21 or across time,22 arouse creditors' suspicion about the
debtor's intentions,23 affect the courts' interpretation of the bond
provision, 24 disrupt firm routines for producing contracts, 25 intensify
cognitive heuristics that resist change,26 or increase the risk of unknown
consequences of change. 27
Many of these explanations for stickiness are, however, suspect.
First, issuers did change the clauses over time and offered different types
of clauses.28 Why would they make the change without solving the
clause's basic problem of potentially hindering restructuring? Second, if
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

See infra text accompanying note 59 (discussing one such reason).
GULATI & SCOTT, supra note I (manuscript at 54).
Id. (manuscript at 43).
Id. (manuscript at 43-44).
See id. (manuscript at 86-87).
Id. (manuscript at 44-45).
Id. (manuscript at 97).
Id. (manuscript at 47).
Id. (manuscript at 49-51).
Id. (manuscript at 51).
Id. (manuscript at 80 tbl.1, 94-95, 158).
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there were significant benefits to changing the clauses, why couldn't the
parties in this relatively small and sophisticated market have clarified
their intentions and eliminated the information problems that cause
misleading signals? A few law firms dominate the market and therefore
seemingly could eventually recover the costs of overcoming learning and
network problems and produce information concerning the effect of
changes that would reduce the market's perception of risk. Also, the
behavioral theories noted above do not clearly cut against change. For
example, the "availability" bias 29 arguably predicts an investor
overreaction to the highly publicized Belgian decision that could offset
any biases against change.
Pari passu's stickiness is even harder to explain in light of other
situations in which bond provisions changed in response to changing
circumstances. For example, Marcel Kahan and Michael Klausner
chronicle the sudden appearance and disappearance of event-risk
covenants in the late 1980s, led by underwriters, in response to a court
decision refusing to protect creditors who had no such covenant. 30 Why
the change in corporate bonds but not sovereign bonds?
There might be something about sovereign bonds that makes them
stickier than corporate bonds. But there is also evidence that sovereign
bonds change appropriately in reaction to market conditions. For
example, Mark Weidemaier and Gulati show that sovereign bonds
evolved quickly in 2003 to include modification clauses even as lawyers
claimed that they were simply copying existing provisions. 3' Unlike the
tweaks Gulati and Scott report regarding pari passu clauses, the
modification clauses did fix the problem. However, this example's
power is limited by the fact that this change arguably
occurred only
32
because the U.S. government actively promoted it.

29. See AMos TVERSKY & DANIEL KAHNEMAN, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristicsand
Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 11 (Daniel Kahneman et al.
eds., 1982) (discussing the judgmental heuristic of "availability" which leads people to "assess
the... probability of an event by the ease with which instances or occurrences can be brought to
mind").
30. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1505, 1519
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that RJR Nabisco, Inc.'s leveraged buyout of the company's shareholders
did not violate any implied restrictive covenant); Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner,
Standardizationand Innovation in CorporateContracting (or "The Economics of Boilerplate"), 83
VA. L. REV. 713, 740-41 (1997) (discussing the development of event-risk covenants).
31. See W. Mark C. Weidemaier & Mitu Gulati, How Markets Work: The Lawyer's Version 6,
11, 20-21 (Univ. N.C. Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 1886435, 2011), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=1 886435.
32. See Anna Gelpern & Mitu Gulati, Public Symbol in Private Contract:A Case Study, 84
WASH. U. L. REV. 1627, 1643 (2006).
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Another change in sovereign bonds is not so easily dismissed: the
rapid addition in the 1970s of dispute resolution clauses to sovereign
bond contracts after enactment of sovereign immunity statutes that
clarified the effect of contractual sovereign immunity waivers.33 This
illustrates that private parties can change sovereign bonds even without
government pressure. Why, then, are some provisions, such as pari
passu, sticky?
C. There Is a Need for Change But Lawyers Will Not Do It
Perhaps issuers did not change pari passu clauses despite their
inadequacy because lawyers were not faithful agents for their creditor
and sovereign clients. More precisely, lawyers know more than clients
about the problem but have too little incentive to spend the time to fix
34

it.

There are, however, problems with this explanation as with the
others discussed above. As Gulati and Scott note, this would be a failure
not just by a single lawyer or firm, but by all the lawyers advising the
sovereign bond market.3" It is therefore unlikely that individual lawyers
simply wanted, for example, to protect themselves from blame for
drafting the original clauses. Moreover, as discussed immediately above,
lawyers did appropriately change other sovereign bond clauses. Why
would lawyers be faithless in the paripassu situation but not in the other
cases?
Recognizing these problems with the faithless agent story, Gulati
and Scott turn to "institutional constraints imposed on the transactional
lawyer by the contemporary 'big law' business model. 3 6 They suggest
that the problem may lie in law firm structure which erects "significant
barriers to innovative contract design. 37 Specifically, increasing partnerto-associate ratios of "big law" firms force them to rely increasingly on
standard forms 38 which high-profit associates can cheaply store and pull
off the shelf. 39 This structure leaves no one able to make the needed
changes in the standard forms. Gulati and Scott propose solving this
problem by restructuring law firms to change their incentives.4 °

33. See W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Contract Change and the Evolution of Sovereign Immunity
1, 10 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Hofstra Law Review).
34. See GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 1 (manuscript at 159-60).
35. Id. (manuscript at 122, 156-57).
36. Id. (manuscript at 121).
37. Id. (manuscript at 156).
38. See id. (manuscript at 101-03).
39. Id. (manuscript at 162-63, 165).
40. Id. (manuscript at 181-82).
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This argument resonates with my work suggesting that large law
firms have overleveraged their reputational capital into bottom-heavy
pyramidal structures that leave little time or incentive for associate
monitoring, mentoring, and screening necessary to maintain firms'
reputations. 41 This seems at first glance to plausibly explain why large
law firms would prefer the "three and a half minute" approach to taking
the time to get the contracts right.
A problem with this explanation is that, regardless of how law firms
are structured, neither lawyers nor their firms have an incentive to put
more than "three and a half minutes" of labor into the contracts. Who
would pay for hours of work by senior partner "oracles" to solve the pari
passu problem, even if these lawyers wanted to invest the time? Gulati
and Scott suggest that the cost pressure actually comes from clients who
want to economize on attorneys' fees, particularly in the sovereign bond
world where time horizons are short and the borrowers are looking for
benchmark rates rather than capital.42
The law firm structure explanation for contract stickiness also does
not explain why "big law" firms did swiftly adopt event-risk covenants
in corporate bonds and dispute resolution clauses in sovereign bonds.
Perhaps there were few enough underwriters' lawyers that they could
internalize the benefits of event-risk covenants. But two law firmsCleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP ("Cleary") and Sullivan &
Cromwell LLP-each had approximately forty percent of the issuer and
underwriter representations in the sovereign bond market.43 Even if this
level of market concentration was inadequate to enable lawyers to solve
the "three and a half minute" problem, the problem may run deeper than
the death of "big law."
III.

TOWARD A PROPERTY RIGHTS EXPLANATION

Although Gulati and Scott see the "three and a half minute"
problem inhering in law firm structure, the explanation more likely lies
in any lawyer's ability to capture the value of innovation in bond
covenants. Indeed, Gulati and Scott themselves point to this explanation
in noting that law firms do not produce research and development that
could benefit contracting parties other than just the individual client
paying for a particular contract. 44 They observe that lawyers "evinced

41. See generally Larry E. Ribstein, The Death of Big Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 749.
42. See GULATI & ScoTT, supra note 1 (manuscript at 162-63, 177-78).
43. See id. (manuscript at 69, 71, 72 fig.2, 73 fig.3) (tabulating the concentration of lawyers in
the sovereign bond market).
44. See id. (manuscript at 164).
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little interest in claiming any property rights in ...innovations., 45 This
may be because they had no property rights in contract innovation to
claim.
In order to understand the problem of lack of property rights, it is
necessary to understand the type of intellectual property that lawyers
would have to create in order to solve the pari passu problem. Given
Part II's analysis of the potential benefit of the clause, the fix was more
complicated than just deleting the clause. Yet, retaining the clause is not
necessarily an answer either because equal creditor rights prevent
efficient restructuring in bad times. The parties might make squeeze-out
more difficult without the high costs of equal treatment by providing for
high vote or appraisal rights, as in the corporate context. But it is not
clear which rights work best for specific contexts or when the rights
should be triggered. Moreover, milder ex post rights dilute pari passu's
ex ante commitment effect. Developing efficient contracts and standard
forms requires experimentation and investments of time and effort.
Gulati and Scott's examples of situations in which lawyers have
partially overcome impediments to investing in creative solutions rather
than simply grabbing standard forms off the shelf"6 suggest the role of
property rights in innovation. The examples show that lawyers such as
Cleary's Lee Buchheit 47 and Elliott's Jay Newman 4 8 have become
leading figures developing creative approaches to sovereign bonds
because they work outside traditional law firm channels. Although
Buchheit works in a large law firm, he lacks "an institutional base."' 9
Newman works for the hedge fund whose challenge led to the Belgian
judgment. 50 Buchheit bundles his creativity with general expertise and
client contacts while Newman is able to use the capital markets to
leverage his expertise.
Buchheit and Newman's ability to capitalize on their investments in
information and knowledge about sovereign bonds is, however, limited.
Although Buchheit might develop a suitable contract and copyright and
sell it for use in bond deals, the contract would lack certainty until a
court interpreted and enforced it. As Gulati and Scott note, the Belgian
judgment lacked the clarity and credibility of, say, a U.S. Second Circuit

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. (manuscript
Id. (manuscript
Id. (manuscript
Id. (manuscript
Id. (manuscript
Id. (manuscript

at
at
at
at
at
at

107).
169-71, 175).
168).
174).
172).
20).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol40/iss1/6

8

Ribstein: Sticky Forms, Property Rights, and the Law

20111

STICKY FORMS, PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND LAW

Court of Appeals decision. 5' Gulati and Scott observe that the "legal
'2
system retains ultimate power over interpretation and enforcement.' ,
Moreover, overcoming the certainty problem complicates the
property rights problem. Once the court interprets and enforces the
contract, the author loses his property rights in it under current U.S.
law. 3 Thus, as soon as the author has something of real value to sell, he
loses his ability to capitalize on that value. This rule adversely affects
incentives to produce materials that might become part of the law. The
discount perversely would increase with the possibility the law might
someday make the materials more valuable.
A property rights perspective helps explain why "big law" could
change event-risk and dispute resolution but not pari passu clauses.
Bond clauses changed swiftly when change was relatively easy. The
market clearly wanted event-risk clauses after the leveraged buyout
threat to bonds become clear, dispute resolution clauses after statutes
clarified their effect, and the nature of the appropriate changes was clear.
But it was less clear what the parties wanted after the Belgian decision in
Elliott Associates, L.P. 54 Because the market continued to favor the
plaintiffs version of pari passu clauses even after that decision
demonstrated its potential costs, simply deleting the provision or
replacing it with another version would not have been a clear
improvement. Although the market might have preferred something
other than a pari passu clause that would have similar ex ante effects,
but less disastrous effects ex post,55 it was unclear exactly what this term
should be.
These problems with changing the pari passu clause seem to return
56
to Gulati and Scott's network and heuristics explanations for stickiness.
However, the property rights story provides a way to distinguish other

51. Id. (manuscript at 110). The Second Circuit did hold that Elliott could enforce its right
under the bonds, rejecting the issuer's champerty defense. Elliott Assocs., L.P. v. Banco de la
Nacion, 194 F.3d 363, 372, 381 (2d Cir. 1999). However, this case left open the issue of how the
bonds would be enforced against Peru. See Bradley et al., supra note 16, at 292.
52. See GULATI & Scorr, supra note 1 (manuscript at 110).
53. This rule was established in two cases dealing with the effect of embodying privately
drafted codes into laws. See Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int'l, 293 F.3d 791, 793-95 (5th Cir.
2002) (en banc); Bldg. Officials & Code Admin. v. Code Tech., Inc., 628 F.2d 730, 731, 734-35 (1st
Cir. 1980). For an analysis of these cases, see generally Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein,
Law, Behavior & Soc. Sci. Research
Law as a ByProduct: Theories of Private Law Production (I11.
Paper Series, Research Paper No. LBSSI1-27, 2011), available at http://ssrn.comlabstract=
1884985.
54. Elliott Assocs., L.P., General Docket No. 2000/QR/92 (Court of Appeal of Brussels, 8th
Chamber, Sept. 26, 2000) (unofficial translation on file with the Hofstra Law Review).
55. See Bratton, supra note 14, at 865.
56. See supra text accompanying notes 19-26.
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changes in bond provisions where the parties could overcome these
problems. The pari passu clause raised problems not only of effectuating
a change in bond contracts, but also of determining what change should
be made. Property rights were necessary to give parties adequate
incentives to engage in the extensive deliberation and experimentation
necessary to come up with the appropriate language.5 7
One more property rights problem remains: how to preserve
property rights after a court interpretation. Such an interpretation was
necessary even for the relatively easy fixes. Although parties could craft
event-risk, modification, and dispute resolution clauses, and overcome
other impediments to making these changes, they could not be sure how
such changes would affect courts' interpretations of pre-existing bonds.
Weidemaier and Gulati hypothesize that lawyers came up with the
makeshift solution of telling "stories of standardization... [that] deflect
attention from the fact that they do make frequent, albeit modest,
changes to contract templates," and thereby help "assure that market
participants will not react unfavorably" to the change.5 8 But no mere
story could clarify how a pari passu clause could provide both ex ante
protection and commitment and ex post flexibility for restructuring.
Only a new provision coupled with definitive court interpretations of the
new language and its effect on existing provisions could provide the
clarity the market demands. Yet, as discussed above, embedding the
contract in a legal rule, while increasing its value, would threaten its
author's property rights. This illustrates the conundrum the existing law
creates for property rights in legal documents.
All of this is not to say that law firm structure is irrelevant to Gulati
and Scott's stickiness hypothesis. Rather, the property rights story
underlies both lawyers' inadequate incentives to create new contracts
and the death of "big law." "Big law" firms' lack of strong property
rights helps explain why they had trouble binding their lawyers. This, in
turn, accounts for big firms' degeneration as they sought to attract new
lateral hires with increasing associate leveraging.5 9 In other words, bond
provisions are sticky for the same reason that large firms are not.
Stronger property rights could help fix law firm structure and motivate
better contracts. So while the death of "big law" helps explain bond
stickiness, simply looking to law firm structure without delving deeper
into property rights may not solve the problem Gulati and Scott address.

57. See Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 53 (manuscript at 18).
58. See Weidemaier & Gulati, supra note 31, at 29.
59. See Ribstein, supra note 41, at 774-75.
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IV.

CONCLUSION

The problem of sticky bond provisions that Gulati and Scott
identify inheres in both the nature of law and the structure of property
rights for its creation. The paripassu problem requires not only drafting
creativity, but also legal certainty. Gulati and Scott show that lawyers'
creativity is stifled by their firms' desire to commoditize drafting so they
can delegate it to associates. 60 But it is necessary to delve deeper to
determine why law firms are structured to inadequately serve their
clients. The basic reason is that solving problems with complex bonds
may require greater investments than individual lawyers or law firms,
however structured, were willing to provide in the absence of stronger
property rights. Moreover, the solutions demand not only greater
investments of time and energy, but also legal certainty. Yet legal
certainty collides with creation incentives because judicial interpretation
may negate property rights in the interpreted contracts. It follows that
part of the solution to the problem of sticky contracts may lie in giving
the creation of law intellectual property protection comparable to that for
other innovations.

60.

See supra text accompanying notes 33-39.
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